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Abstract
We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of
which are mutually compatible. Assuming that each object is either
good or bad, we axiomatically characterize three cardinality-based
rules which arise naturally in this dichotomous setting. They are what
we call the symmetric diﬀerence rule, the lexicographic good-bad rule,
and the lexicographic bad-good rule. Each of these rules induces a
unique additive separable preference relation over the set of all groups
of objects.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, D71.
Keywords: cardinality rankings, lexicographic rules, symmetric
diﬀerence
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper we consider the problem of ranking sets of objects the members
of which are mutually compatible. Situations for which such a ranking can
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1be of use include matching, choice of assemblies, election of new members
of a committee, group identiﬁcation and coalition formation. Very often in
these situations the a priori information one has about the decision maker’s
opinion is simple: it takes the form of a partition on the set of all objects
into "good" and "bad" items.
For example, if the set of objects is a set of individuals, the set of good
objects can consist of all individuals who share a given property or who are
qualiﬁed for a job (cf. Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), Samet and Schmeidler
(2002)). Accordingly, in this case the set of bad objects will include all
individuals who do not have this property or who are not qualiﬁed. Or, in a
slightly diﬀerent context, the set of good objects can contain all candidates
who deserve to become new society members according to the opinion of
some society founder (cf. Berga et al. (2002)), while the set of bad objects
will consist of all candidates who do not deserve this grace. Finally, one can
think of the assignment of software to workers when a given software program
can be compatible or not with a worker’s own machine (cf. Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2003)). Notice that the speciﬁcation of good and bad objects in all
these contexts implies homogeneity and full substitutability of the objects
within a particular group.
Given such kind of dichotomous setting, the question we ask in the present
paper is the following: how can one extend in a meaningful way this rudimen-
tary information about one’s opinion over the single objects to an ordering
on the power set of the set of objects? We answer this question by presenting
axiomatic characterizations of three cardinality-based rules. Each of them
takes into account the number of good objects and the number of bad objects
in the sets under comparison. The rules diﬀer in the way in which these two
numbers are combined. Under our ﬁrst rule, the symmetric diﬀerence rule, a
2set C is considered to be better than another set D if and only if the cardi-
nality of the symmetric diﬀerence between C and the set of all good objects
is smaller than the cardinality of the symmetric diﬀerence between D and
the set of all good objects. Our other two rules are lexicographic. According
to the good-bad rule, the priority is given to the good objects in the corre-
sponding sets, and if these sets have the same number of good objects, then
t h en u m b e ro fb a do b j e c t si sd e c i s i v ef o rt h ec o m p a r i s o n . I nt h ebad-good
rule the priority is given to the bad objects and it is the "dual" version of
the good-bad rule.
It is not diﬃcult to see that each of these rules induces a unique additive
separable preference relation over the set of all groups of objects, the set of
all good objects being its top and the set of all bad objects being its bottom.
Having this in mind, our results can be interpreted as characterizations of
three diﬀerent subclasses of the class of separable preferences, the latter being
commonly used as a primitive in the analysis of voting situations (cf. Barberà
et al. (1991)) and coalition formation games (cf. Burani and Zwicker (2003)).
On the other hand, this paper contributes to the problem of ranking sets of
objects in general. Especially, it can be seen as a translation of the purely
cardinality-based freedom ranking of opportunity sets (cf. Pattanaik and Xu
(1990)) into the context of ranking sets of objects the members of which are
mutually compatible (cf. Barberà et al. (2003)).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to our notation
and basic deﬁnitions. In Section 3 we introduce and discuss the axioms used
in this paper. Our characterization results are collected in Section 4. We
conclude in Section 5.
32 Notation and deﬁnitions
Throughout the paper, let X be a nonempty ﬁnite set of objects. These
objects may be for example candidates considered for membership in a club,
possible coalition partners, bills considered for adoption by a legislature, etc.
Following Fishburn (1992, p. 4), we assume that the information one has
about the decision maker’s opinion on the diﬀerent objects consist only of
a partition {G,B} of X into good objects (collected in G) and bad objects
(collected in B = X \G). Furthermore, we assume that there is at least one
good object and at least one bad object.
In what follows, the set of all subsets of X will be denoted by X.T h ee l e -
ments of X are the (alternative) groups of objects an agent may be confronted
with. The question arises how this agent ranks diﬀerent sets consisting on
diﬀe r e n tn u m b e ro fg o o da n db a di t e m sb a s e do nh i sp a r t i t i o n{G,B} of X.
Consequently, the problem to be analyzed in this paper is how to establish
a quasi-ordering (that is, a reﬂexive and transitive, but not necessarily com-
plete, binary relation) º on X.F o ra l lC,D ∈ X, C º D is to be interpreted
as "C is at least as good as D". The asymmetric and symmetric factors of º
will be denoted by Â ("is better than") and ∼ ("is as good as"), respectively.
The ﬁrst ranking we are interested in is the symmetric diﬀerence ranking
ºM deﬁned by letting, for all C,D ∈ X,
C ºM D ⇔ |C M G| ≤ |D M G|.
According to this rule, if C and D contain the same number of good objects,
C will be at least as good as D i fa n do n l yi ft h en u m b e ro fb a do b j e c t si n
C is less than the corresponding number for D. Analogously, if C and D
contain the same number of bad objects, C will be at least as good as D if
and only if the number of good objects in C is greater than the corresponding
4number for D. Finally, if C and D have diﬀerent numbers of good and bad
objects, the rule adds the number of bad objects in the corresponding set to
the number of good objects which are not in that set in order to produce a
comparison.
In a voting context for example, one can think of a voter caring not only
about the elected candidates he likes, but also paying attention to the elected
candidates he does not like. Assuming that the set of candidates consists
only of "candidates, who deserve to be elected" and "candidates, who do
not deserve to be elected", the two sets being homogeneous, the symmetric
diﬀerence rule presents a natural way of extracting voter’s preferences over
the set of diﬀerent committees.
Next, we introduce a rule which gives priority to the good elements in
the two sets under comparison.
The good-bad rule ºGB is deﬁned by letting, for all C,D ∈ X,
C ºGB D ⇔
(|C ∩ G| > |D ∩ G| or [|C ∩ G| = |D ∩ G| and |C ∩ B| ≤ |D ∩ B|]).
This rule looks ﬁrst at the good elements in the sets C and D.I f t h e
number for C is greater than the number for D,t h e nC is declared as better
than D. If these two numbers are equal, C is better than D if and only if
the number of bad elements in C is smaller than the corresponding number
for D.
Our last rule, the bad-good rule ºBG is "dual" to the good-bad rule, and
it is deﬁned by letting, for all C,D ∈ X,
C ºBG D ⇔
(|C ∩ B| < |D ∩ B| or [|C ∩ B| = |D ∩ B| and |C ∩ G| ≥ |D ∩ G|]).
5As already mentioned in the Introduction and exempliﬁed below, each
of these rules induces a unique additive separable preference relation over
the set of all groups of objects. Recall, that a binary relation º on X is
additive separable if there exists a real-valued function u : X → < such that




w∈D u(w) for all C,D ∈ X.
Example 1 Let X = {x,y,z} and (G,B)=( {x,y},{z}).T h e n ,t h er a n k -
ings over X induced by the three rules are the following:
(i) {x,y}Â M {x} ∼M {y} ∼M {x,y,z}Â M ∅∼ M {x,z} ∼M {y,z}Â M {z};
(ii) {x,y}Â GB {x,y,z}Â GB {x} ∼GB {y}Â GB {x,z} ∼GB {y,z}Â GB
∅ ÂGB {z};
(iii) {x,y}Â BG {x} ∼BG {y}Â BG ∅ ÂBG {x,y,z}Â BG {x,z} ∼BG
{y,z}Â BG {z}.
To see that these binary relations are additive separable, take u(x)=u(y)=1
and u(z)=−1 (for ºM), u(x)=u(y)=2and u(z)=−1 (for ºGB),
u(x)=u(y)=1and u(z)=−3 (for ºBG).
3A x i o m s
In this section we ﬁrst present several properties a binary relation º on X
may satisfy. Then we discuss their contents and some of their implications,
paying attention to our speciﬁcs e t t i n g .
We will say that º∈ X×Xsatisﬁes
• Independence of good objects (IGO) iﬀ, for all C,D ∈ X,a l lx ∈ G\C,
and all y ∈ G \ D,
C ∼ D ⇔ C ∪ {x} ∼ D ∪ {y}.
6• Independence of bad objects (IBO) iﬀ, for all C,D ∈ X,a l lx ∈ B \ C,
and all y ∈ B \ D,
C ∼ D ⇔ C ∪ {x} ∼ D ∪ {y}.
• Perfect dichotomy (PD) iﬀ,f o ra l lC,D ∈ X,a l lx ∈ C ∩ G,a n da l l
y ∈ B \ D,
C ∼ D ⇒ C \{ x} ∼ D ∪ {y}.
• Simple addition of good objects (SAGO) iﬀ, for all C,D ∈ X,a l ly ∈ G,
{x,y}Â{ x}.
• Good inﬂuence (GINF) iﬀ,f o ra l lC,D ∈ X,a l lx ∈ D ∩ G,
C º D ⇒ C Â D \{ x}.
• Simple addition of bad objects (SABO) iﬀ,f o ra l lC,D ∈ X,a l ly ∈ B,
{x}Â{ x,y}.
• Bad inﬂuence (BINF) iﬀ, for all C,D ∈ X,a l lx ∈ B \ D,
C º D ⇒ C Â D ∪ {x}.
• Strict independence (SI) iﬀ, for all C,D ∈ X,a n da l lx ∈ X \(C ∪ D),
C Â D ⇒ C ∪ {x}ÂD ∪ {x}.
In independence of good objects we express the fact that all good objects
are perfect substitutes.I fas e tC is as good as another set D, then adding
or deleting a simple good object to or from each set preserves the indiﬀer-
ence regardless of the identity of the other objects in these sets. Together
with reﬂexivity, this axiom implies that every two singletons consisting of
(possibly diﬀerent) good objects will be indiﬀerent (cf. Jones and Sugden
(1982), Pattanaik and Xu (1990)). Note in addition that application of the
independence of good objects will produce indiﬀerence between any two sets
7of objects having the same number of elements and containing good objects
only. The interpretation of independence of bad objects is similar.
The next axiom, perfect dichotomy, states that "being good" and "not
being bad" have the same meaning for the decision maker, i.e. the "marginal
rate of substitution" between good and bad objects is 1. This axiom says
that if two sets of objects are indiﬀe r e n t ,a d d i n gab a de l e m e n tt ot h eo n e
set does not change the things if it is combined with a subtraction of a good
object from the other set.
Simple addition of good objects requires that a doubleton, consisting of
any object x and a good object, is always better than the singleton consisting
of x.G i v e nt h a tº is reﬂexive and satisﬁes independence of good objects, it
is implied by the good inﬂuence axiom. The latter requires that if two sets of
objects are indiﬀerent, deleting a good object from one of them makes that
set worse. In addition, the axiom says that the strict preference is preserved
if one deletes a good element from the worse set. This axiom was introduced
by Barberà et al. (1991) and, more explicitly, by Fishburn (1992). The
interpretation of the next two axioms, simple addition of bad objects and
bad inﬂuence, is analogous.
Finally, strict independence shares the same spirit as the independence
axiom (labeled as monotonicity) by Kannai and Peleg (1984) and the inde-
pendence requirement used by Pattanaik and Xu (1990). Essentially, this
axiom says that adding the same element (good or bad) to two sets under
comparison respects the strict preference between these sets. Note also that
strict independence is stronger than Kannai and Peleg’s corresponding axiom
and weaker than Pattanaik and Xu’s independence condition.
84 Characterization results
In this section we characterize the three cardinality-based rules introduced
in Section 2.
Theorem 1 º satisﬁes IGO, IBO, PD, GINF, and BINF if and only if
º=ºM.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that ºM satisﬁes the corresponding
axioms. Suppose that º satisﬁes IGO, IBO, PD, GINF, and BINF. It is
suﬃcient to prove that, for all C,D ∈ X,
|C M G| = |D M G| ⇒ C ∼ D, (1)
and
|C M G| > |D M G| ⇒ C ≺ D. (2)
For (1), let C,D ∈ X be such that |C M G| = |D M G|.W ep r o v eC ∼ D
by induction on k = |C M G|.I fk =0 ,t h e nC = G = D,a n dC ∼ D follows
from reﬂexivity of º.I fk>0,a s s u m et h a tC ∼ D holds for k−1.C o n s t r u c t
C0 ∈ X as follows: if G ⊂ C,t h e nt a k eC0 by deleting a bad object from
C (which exists since k>0), otherwise take C0 by adding a good object to
C.C o n s t r u c t D0 analogously. Then |C0 M G| = |D0 M G| = k − 1 and, by
induction, C0 ∼ D0.I fC0 ⊂ C and D0 ⊂ D,t h e nC ∼ D follows by IBO. If
C0 ⊃ C and D0 ⊃ D,t h e nC ∼ D follows by IGO. Otherwise, C ∼ D follows
by PD.
For (2), let C,D ∈ X be such that |C M G| > |D M G|.T h e nt h e r ee x i s t
α ⊆ C ∩ B and β ⊆ G \ C such that |((C \ α) ∪ β) M G| = |D M G|.B y
(1), we then have (C \ α) ∪ β ∼ D. Applying GINF the necessary times we
obtain (C \ α) ≺ D.B yt h er e p e a t e du s eo fB I N F ,w eﬁnally have C ≺ D.
9Theorem 2 º satisﬁes IGO, IBO, SAGO, BINF, and SI if and only if
º=ºGB.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that ºGB satisﬁes the corresponding
axioms. Suppose that º satisﬁes IGO, IBO, SAGO, BINF, and SI. It is
suﬃcient to prove that, for all C,D ∈ X,
C ∼GB D ⇒ C ∼ D, (3)
and
C ÂGB D ⇒ C Â D. (4)
For (3), suppose that C ∼GB D for some C,D ∈ X.B yd e ﬁnition, this
is equivalent to |C ∩ G| = |D ∩ G| and |C ∩ B| = |D ∩ B|.I fC = D,t h e n
C ∼ D follows from reﬂexivity of º.N o ws u p p o s eC 6= D.B yt h er e p e a t e d
use of IGO (starting from ∅∼∅ ), C ∩ G ∼ D ∩ G. Repeating IBO the
n e c e s s a r yt i m e s ,w eo b t a i nC ∼ D.
For (4), we can distinguish between two cases:
(i) |C ∩ G| > |D ∩ G|. Then there exists a D0 ∈ X such that |C ∩ G| =
|D0 ∩ G| and D0 = D ∪ D00 with D00 ⊂ G.B y( 3 ) ,w et h e nh a v e
C ∼ D
0.( 5 )
Let d ∈ D and D00 = {d00
1,...,d 00
t}. Then, by SAGO, {d,d00
1}Â{ d}.H e n c e ,
by the repeated use of SI, we have D∪{d00
1}ÂD. By the same construction,
we have D ∪ {d00
1,d 00
2}ÂD ∪ {d00





2}, ..., D0 =
D∪D00 Â D∪(D00 \ d00
t). By transitivity of º,w eh a v eD0 Â D and, together
with (5), we obtain C Â D.
(ii) |C ∩ G| = |D ∩ G| and |C ∩ B| < |D ∩ B|.L e t C = {c1,...,c s},
D = {d1,...,d t}, C ∩ G = {c1,...,c p}, D ∩ G = {d1,...,d p}, p<s<t .B y
10the repeated use of IGO, C ∩ G ∼ D ∩ G.R e p e a t i n g I B O s − p times, we
obtain C =( C ∩ G) ∪ {cp+1,...,c s} ∼ (D ∩ G) ∪ {dp+1,...,d s}. Finally, by
the repeated use of BINF we have C Â (D ∩ G) ∪ {dp+1,...,d s,...,d t}, i.e.
C Â D.
Theorem 3 º satisﬁes IGO, IBO, SABO, GINF, and SI if and only if
º=ºBG.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.
Note that in the three characterizations it is suﬃcient to assume that
º is reﬂexive and transitive - completeness follows as a consequence of this
assumption and the axioms.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have characterized three cardinality-based rules for ranking
sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible, namely, the
symmetric diﬀerence rule, the good-bad rule and the bad-good rule. All these
rules share two important features. First, each of them induces a unique
additive separable preference relation over the set of all groups of objects
and, second, each rule makes use of both good and bad objects in the sets
under comparison.
A related issue that may be addressed in the future concerns the intro-
duction of a partition on each particular group of objects. For example, the
simple information structure we have in this paper can be enriched by em-
bedding a similarity relation (cf. Pattanaik and Xu (2000)) on the group of
good and bad objects. This will allow one to discriminate among diﬀerent
11subgroups of similar good (bad) objects and to consider extensions of the
rules characterized here.
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